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ABSTRACT One of the most basic 
linguistic principles (or parameters, 
according to some) is used to point 
to a likely necessary (though, 
probably, not sufficient) condition of 
human uniqueness (i.e. being able to 
speak, communicate complex 
messages, have religious feelings, 
indulge in art and humour, and so 
on) which has been conceptualised 
either as the fact that we have 
human souls, in religious contexts, or 
human minds, in other contexts. 
KEY WORDS Cognitive principles. 
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Una manera posible de naturalizar 
el alma humana
RESUMEN Utilizando uno de los 
principios (aunque algunos lo 
consideran un parámetro) básicos 
que subyacen en la organización de 
los idiomas naturales se apunta a 
una de las condiciones necesarias 
(aunque posiblemente no 
suficientes) para esa especificidad 
humana única (la de hablar, 
comunicar mensajes complejos, 
tener sentimientos religiosos, 
experimentar el arte, gozar con el 
humor, etc) que se ha 
conceptualizado como alma en los 
contextos religiosos y como mente 
en otros contextos.
PALABRAS CLAVE Principios 
cognitivos. Naturalizar. Alma. Mente.
Une manière possible de 
naturaliser l'âme humaine 
RÉSUMÉ Partant de l’un des 
principes (d’autres les appellent des 
paramètres) fondamentaux de 
l’organisation linguistique on essaye 
d’expliquer la condition unique de la 
spécificité humaine (c’est à dire, la 
faculté de parler, communiquer des 
messages très complexes, avoir des 
sentiments religieux, expérimenter 
l’art, et être capable d’humour) qui a 
été conceptualisée soit comme 
l’âme humaine dans des contextes 
religieux, ou bien comme l’esprit 
dans d’autres contextes.
MOTS CLÉS Principes cognitifs. 
Naturaliser. Âme. Esprit.
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A possible way
to naturalize the human soul
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In one of his papers, “Naturaliser l’esprit”(1999), Dan Sperber, in an indirect way, 
enjoins us to try and naturalize as many aspects as possible of what has been vaguely 
considered spiritual in the human studies until now. !is paper, among others, has 
been for me an intellectual revulsive for a long period of my recent professional 
history. And now, a"er my retirement, I somehow managed to find enough time to 
think about it in a more continuous way. What follows is a collection of hypotheses 
with which I have tried to follow Sperber’s advice; my hope is that they will 
eventually set the bases for an articulate natural theory about these ma#ers.
In French, as you may already know, the word esprit is somehow ambiguous. It 
may signal what we call “spirit” and/or “soul”, in English, but also what we call 
“mind”. I think it is a good ambiguity, if I may say so; for it permits me to make use of 
it, translating the French term as soul, at first, although, eventually, the mind 
translation may appear more appropriate.
According to what he says in the entry soul of his Dictionaire Philosophique, 
Voltaire thinks that this term points to a stupid concept which no one has been able 
to describe accurately. We may intuitively agree with his strong assertion, and yet, 
we may also start wondering why it is that humans at large have always thought they 
differed from other animals in precisely this feature. Is it only because they have an 
unbounded pride and consider themselves somehow part of the divinity? Supposing 
that this were accepted as an explanation, the question, then, could be rephrased: 
how come that we are able to feel that immense pride about our soul, in the first 
place?
In other words, why not try and change our perception of this concept, the 
human soul, from a mysterious object which hangs from a sky hook, to a biological 
entity of some sort but with deep roots in our evolutionary history?
As you are aware, skyhooks are, not only inexistent, but absolutely impossible. 
How is it, then, that there are so many concepts which are somehow viewed as 
hanging from those unlikely hooks? One explanation is our powerful human tool 
that scientists analyze in the field called Semantics. As we already know from their 
findings, humans are able to establish all sorts of relationships between mental and 
real objects by using their meaning as a way to link them in mental representations. 
Let me give you a quick example with the watchmaker argument which is used to 




• !e complex inner-workings of a watch presuppose an intelligent designer.
• As with a watch, the complexity of a particular organ or organism, the structure of the solar 
system, life, the entire universe and whatnot also presuppose a Designer.
!e watch analogy is, then, semantically related to another element in a different 
field and thereby it establishes the semantic plausibility of a general idea: you can tell, 
simply by looking at something, whether or not it was the product of intelligent design. If 
you look at the world at large, you must also know without any doubt that it was 
created purposely by a Great Watchmaker, i.e., God.
I don’t want to imply that this semantic way of relating concepts is vacuous or 
useless. A"er all, it is a well developed faculty in the human species and it surely 
gives us a sense of tranquillity by allowing different aspects of our environment fit 
into mental structures that do not depend solely on our perceptive abilities but also 
on our hopes and fears. !is very same paper is naturally full of those semantic links 
which will help you, I hope, into building an accurate mental representation of what 
I am going to say herea"er. 
I do believe, however, that in order to a#ain a well founded understanding of 
things we must adopt the scientific way of thinking, i.e., a very constrained way of 
processing information which establishes causal explanatory chains of a material (or 
materializing) sort. It is only by so doing that one is able to predict what type of effect 
will follow from what cause. And, as you all know, to be able to predict is one of the 
aims of the scientific endeavour.
To illustrate what I have just said, let me start now by proposing semantic 
relationships which may turn up as material causal relationships a"erwards. You 
surely remember Archimedes boasting: “give me a place to stand and I will move the 
earth”. As you know, he was talking about levers, and levers, without any shadow of 
doubt, are physical entities that do physical movements. Now, let me relate 
semantically the functioning of these levers to what Charles Darwin did with his 
Natural Selection !eory. In other words., if we imagine some of the concepts now 
hanging from those impossible skyhooks and view them as the result of a process 
that could be metaphorically compared to a chain of tiny levers each representing a 
very small step in evolution, we may get an idea of what it really (i.e., physically) 
amounts to. So, instead of hanging concepts from skyhooks and deriving all sorts of 
ideas from them, we may be able to visualize casual (materialistic) chain of events 
that, starting from the beginning (say, the Big-Bang), will end up, if properly 
understood, by reaching concepts that have been hung on skyhooks until nowadays. 
If such be the case, those concepts will have, from now on, solid material scaffolding 
and can, therefore, be unhooked, without danger of le#ing them crash into 
nothingness1.
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1 Cfr. Dennett, 1995, for a fuller account of this procedure
!is is the present challenge we are facing, the one that Sperber told us to solve 
and which I will now try to sketch here. How can we unhook the concept soul from 
the sky of our minds by finding a likely material scaffold to make it stand firmly on 
it? !e first thing I will propose, though, is to change the term “soul” (full of heavenly 
implications) by the more accurate expression “human mind”. !e second 
consideration I would like you to accept is to have the patience to follow my train of 
reasoning from where I started wondering about these ma#ers: from the world of 
Linguistics and human communication.
!ere are very few things to which human beings agree universally. Language, for 
instance, has been considered from very different points of view. And yet, as far as I 
know, almost everybody believes that our human language, and the way we use it for 
communication, is one of the clearest faculties which separate us from the so-called 
animal kingdom. Even if we accept that some of its species have languages to 
communicate, we see in our own linguistic tool so many radical differences from 
those used by other animals that we readily accept that it is the feature which 
distinguishes humanity from the rest of living beings.
Let me point to a curious characteristic of our language with an example from 
English (based on Radford), for the benefit of the non-conversant in Linguistics:
(i) All researchers in Linguistics (are here).
(ii) All researchers from France (are here).
(iii) All researchers in Linguistics from France (are here). 
(iv) * All researchers from France in Linguistics (are here).
(v) * All researchers in Linguistics in Pragmatics (are here).
(vi) All researchers from France in Spain (are here).
It seems strange at first glance that some of the noun phrases of the above 
sentences are impossible in English, whereas the rest are perfectly acceptable. 
Apparently, they are all formed by a determiner a noun and one or two prepositional 
phrases, and yet, no English speaking native would admit (iv) or (v) as correct.
Let us consider these sentences in reverse: the reason why (v) is impossible while 
(vi) is absolutely correct lies in the fact that in (v), both prepositional sentences are 
cases of phrase recursion, while in (v) they are not embedded but modifier elements 
of researchers, and there is no way that a Noun in English may have more than one 
adjunct. !is is reinforced by the possibility of (iii) and the impossibility of (iv) In 
(iii), the prepositional phrase (in Linguistics) stands near the N it modifies, while the 
embedded prepositional phrase (from France) is further away showing thereby that it 
modifies the whole phrase (all researchers in Linguistics). Whereas (iv) is impossible, 
because the order in which both prepositional phrases appear is not correct. !at 
means that, while looking alike in their lineal appearance, (i) and (ii) have different 
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structures with correspondently different meanings. In (i) the sentence implies that 
“researchers in Linguistics research linguistic (topics)”, while (ii) does not imply that 
“researchers form France research France (aspects)”, but rather that 1) they are 
researchers and 2) they come from France2.
!is linguistic feature is called recursion at it has been considered the central 
characteristic of the human linguistic process3. It is indeed the faculty that allows 
linguistic expressions to be infinite. However, it has recently been pointed to my 
a#ention that in the web page of the Edge Foundation4, there is a heated debate about 
this particular feature in some so-called primitive languages. As far as I understand 
from the documents in this web page, what started the debate was a talk with Daniel 
L. Evere#, Recursion and Human !ought: Why the Pirahã Don’t Have Numbers, 
published in 2007(?) with the following debate which certainly dates from 2007. 
However, what Evere# claims is, in short, that recursion may indeed be a 
fundamental feature of the human mind computational power, but instead of being 
what Chomsky calls a linguistic principle (a universal characteristic of language), it 
would be#er be considered just a parameter (a feature that might appear in some 
languages and not in others). I don’t want to enter into the details of the debate 
which you may anyway find in the quoted page if you wish. And although I tend on 
the whole to agree more with his critics than with Evere#’s claim, let me proceed 
here as if this possibility had some substance. I will propose, then, that the recursive 
faculty is deeply rooted in our species, the linguistic being only one of the 
manifestations of its functioning.
According to Sperber & Wilson (1995), our process of communication must be 
understood in the frame of recursion. We may no longer maintain the fiction that 
human communication is a simple question of an interlocutor coding a message and 
another decoding it. !is would be mighty straightforward, indeed, but alas! It does 
no do full justice to the complexity of the communicative process. Sperber & Wilson 
rightly distinguish the desire to inform that something is the case, and the desire to 
communicate that information. We may schematize that idea like this:
[I wish to communicate (that I wish to inform about “this and that”)]
In this manner, we are able to realize right away that there are two wishes here, 
one of which is embedded in the other, i.e, they are recursive. !is may seem a bit 
outstretched to some of you, but a simple example, will show that it is precisely in 
this way that we humans communicate with each other. Imagine the expression,
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2 Cfr. Hornstein, 1981
3 See, for instance, Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch (2002)
4 <http://www.edge.org/discourse/recursion.html>.
Nicephorus has always been very intelligent.
It is quite obvious that the linguistic expression predicates a positive 
characteristic of Nicephorus. If we would stick to the mystifying idea that human 
verbal communication is a simple question of decoding sentences, the explanation of 
the following situation would be a mighty hard bone to chew:
(A) Nicephorus, who is forty, still believes in Santa Claus!
(B) Nicephorus has always been very intelligent.
How come that, in this case, B is meaning exactly the opposite of the linguistic 
expression he has encoded in his u#erance? Only by using the idea of a recursive 
process, may one describe what is going on here. Sperber and Wilson propose that 
the communicative act should be characterized by two such processes, i.e., 
(1) By starting talking at this precise moment, B wants to communicate that
(2) B wants to inform that he detaches himself from the potential idea codified in his u"erance of 
the expression “Nicephorus has always being very intelligent”.
I am not going to enter now into the mental processes that make us interpret B’s 
u#erance in the opposite sense of what it means if it were decoded without the frame 
of (1) above. !is frame allows us to describe how we build up a context which acts as 
a set of premises that, processed in relation to the premise coded in the linguistic 
expression, allows us to interpret the u#erance as an ironic one.
!e example could give the false impression that this recursive representation of 
the human communicative process is appropriate only in non-literal uses of the 
linguistic code. But Sperber and Wilson rightly claim that this is always the way we 
communicate. As it happens, in human communication, language does not fully 
determine the information we want our interlocutors to access. We use language as a 
tool to point to some of our thoughts, but we use it economically, taking whatever 
other means available to this end as possible (.i.e, tone of voice, gestures, aspects of 
the environment that are manifest –in one word, context). So, the following coded 
expression:
I am too tired
has a different interpretation if presented like this:
In this situation (X has proposed to go out to dance) A says:




In this situation (A has just quit a marathon race) A says:
 I’m too tired
Or in any other situation you may imagine.
Let me point out that, accurately speaking, we may need to posit a three layer 
recursive process to describe simple human communication:
{When A starts talking she wishes to communicate that
 [in this situation A wants to inform that
  (she is too tired)]}
If this is, indeed, the crucial representation of how we communicate with each 
other in a most simplified description, imagine the recursive depth of some more 
complex cases of communication. To illustrate that potential complexity, let me use 
the example of one of Dr. Wilson’s ex-students, the Mexican researcher, Carmen 
Curçó (1995 and 1996).
Imagine that, a"er watching the German movie Der Unterfall (on the last hours of 
Hitler and his regime), A says to B:
Hitler was a good guy
B, as described above, would start her interpretation by using the recursive 
structure: 
{When A has started talking she wishes to communicate that
  [in this situation A wants to inform me that
   (Hitler was a good guy)]}
Her interpretation may be processed in the following ways:
Case A
first premise:  A tries that
      I come to know that
       A believes that
        Hitler was a good guy
second premise: I believe that
      Hitler was NOT a good guy
conclusion:   I think B is mistaken.
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Case B
first premise:  A tries that
      I come to know that
       A tries that
        I believe that
         Hitler was a good guy
second premise: I believe that
      A believes that
       Hitler was NOT a good guy
conclusion:   I believe that A is lying.
Case C
first premise:  A tries that
      I come to know that
       A tries that
        I believe that
         Hitler was a good guy
second premise: I believe that
      A believes that
       I believe that
        Hitler was NOT a good guy
conclusion:   I believe that A is trying to convince me of something I don’t think is the case
Case D
first premise:  A tries that
      I come to know that
       A tries that
        I believe that
         Hitler was a good guy
second premise:  I believe that
      A believes that
       I believe that
        A believes that
         Hitler was NOT a good guy
conclusion:   I believe that A is being ironical
Supposing that you have followed me so far, it is clear now that recursion, on top 
of being a communicative tool, allows humanity to have false ideas, lie, convince and 
be ironic. Are all these features part of what, for example, Antonio Damasio (1994) 




Many simple organisms, even those with only a single cell and no brain, perform actions 
spontaneously or in response to stimuli in the environment; that is, they produce behaviour. 
Some of these actions are contained in the organisms themselves, and can be either 
hidden to observers (for instance, a contraction in an interior organ), or externally 
observable (a twitch, or the extension of a limb). Other actions (crawling, walking, 
holding an object) are directed at the environment. But in some simple organisms and in 
all complex organisms, actions, whether spontaneous or reactive, are caused by commands 
from a brain. (Organisms with a body and no brain, but capable of movement, it should 
be noted, preceded and then coexisted with organisms that have both body and brain.)
Not all actions commanded by a brain are caused by deliberation. 
On the contrary, it is a fair assumption that most so-called brain caused actions 
being taken at this very moment in the world are not deliberated at all. /ey are simple 
responses of which a reflex is an example: a stimulus conveyed by one neuron leading 
another neuron to act. 
As organisms acquired greater complexity, “brain-caused” actions required more 
intermediate processing. Other neurons were interpolated between the stimulus 
neuron and the response neuron, and varied parallel circuits were thus set up, but it 
did not follow that the organism with that more complicated brain necessarily had a 
mind. Brains can have many intervening steps in the circuits mediating between stimulus and 
response, and still have no mind, if they do not meet an essential condition: the ability to 
display images internally and to order those images in a process called thought. (/e images 
are not solely visual; there are also “sound images,” “olfactory images,” and so on.) My 
statement about behaving organisms can now be completed by saying that not all have 
minds, that is, not all have mental phenomena (which is the same as saying that not all have 
cognition or cognitive processes). Some organisms have both behavior and cognition. Some 
have intelligent actions but no mind. No organism seems to have mind but no action.
 (89-90; emphasis added)
Being no biologist, it is not clear to me what Damasio’s “intervening steps” might 
be. I suppose there to be an evolutive story for the architecture of each or, at least, 
some of them. However, I am almost sure the human soul lacks such an architecture, 
and therefore I will stick to Fodor’s (1983) advice and concentrate in the functioning 
of the relevant cognitive processes that may be involved –not their neurophysiologic 
characteristics which, a"er all, have organized themselves the way they appear to us 
now so as permit them to perform those cognitive functions (and not the other way 
around, as some people seem to think). Or, to say it more clearly, in evolution, 
functional needs urged physiological ones.
Staying in the cognitive field, then, there seems to be a very small processing 
mutation that may be envisaged as the crucial step that allowed us to have “minds”, 
in Damasio’s sense. We have seen it at work in linguistic and communicative 
processes, which everybody will agree are a specific trait of human beings. Recursion 
or, at least, massive recursion is something that happens only in the human 
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processing of information. Not only that: it is also widely used in the storing of 
mental representations. Dan Sperber (1977), among others, clearly distinguishes 
between representations which are directly kept in our mental box of 
representations, and those that are inside some other representation(s). He stresses 
that both types of storage do not alter the cognitive nature of the representations 
thus kept, but only cause us to react differently towards them. I can’t resist telling 
you one of his examples (cfr., Sperber, 1974).
People, who belong to the African ethnic group of the Dorze, apparently have two 
very strong beliefs which they will accept as self-evident in any conversation: (1) 
jaguars do not like the presence of humans and so there is no risk to find them 
lurking in their villages. (2) Jaguars are good Muslims and therefore do not fancy 
eating meat on Fridays. However, although the Dorze let their children play alone 
inside the village boundaries, they insist in that some well armed adult accompanies 
them if they are leaving the premises, … even on Fridays! Sperber argues that the 
first belief is kept directly in the box of beliefs while the second one is kept inside 
another factual (that is., it is a provable fact) belief of the type, [wise people say that 
[jaguars are good Muslims]] or any similar frame. In other words, it is a recursive 
belief. And although we may accept them as equally evident, the fact is that 
embedded beliefs do not guarantee the same behavioural effects in all cases. 
Embedded beliefs seem to be less coherently bound with our potential consequent 
actions; they permit, as it were, a certain distance between belief and behaviour; a 
distance that may help us to have a vantage point to observe and ponder about it. 
!is might be thought as a possible trait of conscious thinking, might it not? 
!ere are more curious (and important) results of some recursive processes that 
seem to strengthen my hypothesis about their crucial import in describing the 
human mind (or soul). Let me turn to four such results which would otherwise be 
inexplicable without resorting to recursion and which, as humour is, are also 
considered central to human spiritual condition: religion, art, and science.
We will start with religion. Although there is no scientific proof that supernatural 
entities do indeed exist, most, if not all, human cultures insist on some godly 
worshiping of one kind or another. Why should that be? Let me propose that these 
supernatural entities (one or many gods) have to do with the recursive disposition to 
assign intentions to interlocutors which we have seen at work in language analysis. 
If, when hearing Mary say that John has always been very intelligent, we somehow 
deduce from different stimuli in the environment that the intention of Mary is 
ironical, we are a#ributing her an intention which is at odds with her expression 
which could be schematized like this [Mary is saying ironically that (John has always 
been very intelligent)]. A#ributing intentions then is the result of a recursive 
process. Now, when humans do not understand some events that seem dangerous to 
them, they resort to a#ribute intention to them. It is what Dennet (1996) argues, 
indeed: that humans adopt the intentional stance when they don’t understand the 
functioning of some threat or another. Now, if we don’t understand the physical 
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mechanisms of, say, a tempest, when we are at sea way out from the coast, and this 
tempest makes us fear the worst, we a#ribute intentions to X by sending us this 
tempest and therefore are in position to pray X not to drown us. In other words, 
a#ributing intentions presupposes an intentional being, which, in turn, is 
presupposed as a (supernatural) person – i.e., in this case, the god of tempests. If we 
are awed by the complex mysteries of Nature, on the other hand, we will also 
a#ribute intentions and, therefore, personality to a single entity –God almighty.
What happens with art? As you know, anything might be considered art 
nowadays. It seems, then, that what we are observing when we point with the term 
“art” is neither a given kind of (artistic) object, nor a kind of (artistic) reception of it. 
It may be more profitable to use the word “art” to signal an a"itude. Now consider 
that, if irony might be considered such an a#itude, it can be schematized in a 
recursive frame: {I value ironically [X]}. My proposal is that the word “art” point to a 
similar recursive process: {I value artistically [X]} Two things must be clear here: (1) 
I am in no way a#empting to define what art is (there are far too many definitions of 
it to try a new one!) I am just pointing to a cognitive recursive process which we may 
now describe by doing a lot of thinking. (2) Consequently, I am well aware that the 
concept [ART] in our culture is a very complex one, as religion probably is (see the 
analysis a#empted by Pascal Boyer (2001) in his Religion explained, for instance). 
What I am trying to say is that if the human mind would be unable to embed 
representations inside other representations, we would probably lack, religion and 
art. And humour, as we have briefly seen before in the account of Curçó, above.
To end this hypothesis on the power of recursion, as you may remember from 
what I mentioned above, scientific knowledge is also possible because we are able to 
treat some of our directly stored representations and embed them into other factual 
representations. I think it is clear that we all have the factual representation that we 
are all living beings. But we are able to question the whys and wherefores of this 
otherwise direct representation. We are able to embed it into high order 
representations. {I understand scientifically that [I’m alive]}.
In short, a very small mutation has allowed human beings to compute massive 
recursive processes and, I propose, this may be the natural way to start thinking 
about our soul (or, less grandiloquently, our mind).
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